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Immunization of Health-Care Workers: 
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
 
Immunization Practices (ACIP) and the Hospital Infection
 
Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC)
 
Summary 
This report summarizes recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Im­
munization Practices (ACIP) concerning the use of certain immunizing agents in 
health-care workers (HCWs) in the United States. It was prepared in consultation 
with the Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) and 
is consistent with current HICPAC guidelines for infection control in health-care 
personnel. These recommendations can assist hospital administrators, infection 
control practitioners, employee health physicians, and HCWs in optimizing in­
fection prevention and control programs. Background information for each 
vaccine-preventable disease and specific recommendations for use of each vac­
cine are presented. The diseases are grouped into three categories: a) those for 
which active immunization is strongly recommended because of special risks for 
HCWs; b) those for which immunoprophylaxis is or may be indicated in certain 
circumstances; and c) those for which protection of all adults is recommended. 
This report reflects current ACIP recommendations at the time of publication. 
ACIP statements on individual vaccines and disease updates in MMWR should 
be consulted for more details regarding the epidemiology of the diseases, im­
munization schedules, vaccine doses, and the safety and efficacy of the 
vaccines. 
INTRODUCTION 
Because of their contact with patients or infective material from patients, many 
health-care workers (HCWs)(e.g., physicians, nurses, emergency medical personnel, 
dental professionals and students, medical and nursing students, laboratory techni­
cians, hospital volunteers, and administrative staff) are at risk for exposure to and 
possible transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases. Maintenance of immunity is 
therefore an essential part of prevention and infection control programs for HCWs. 
Optimal use of immunizing agents safeguards the health of workers and protects pa­
tients from becoming infected through exposure to infected workers (Table 1) (1–15 ). 
Consistent immunization programs could substantially reduce both the number of 
susceptible HCWs in hospitals and health departments and the attendant risks for 
transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases to other workers and patients (16 ). In 
addition to HCWs in hospitals and health departments, these recommendations apply 
to those in private physicians’ offices, nursing homes, schools, and laboratories, and 
to first responders. 
Any medical facility or health department that provides direct patient care is en­
couraged to formulate a comprehensive immunization policy for all HCWs. The 
American Hospital Association has endorsed the concept of immunization programs 
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TABLE 1. Recommendations for immunization practices and use of immunobiologics 
applicable to disease prevention among health-care workers — Advisory Committee 
on Immunization Practices (ACIP) statements published as of September 1, 1997 
Subject MMWR Publication 
General recommendations on immunization 1994;43(No.RR-1):1-39 
Adult immunization 1991;40(No.RR-12):1-94 
Altered immunocompetence 1993;42(No.RR-4):1-18 
Adverse reactions, contraindications, and
precautions 1996;45(No.RR-12):1-35 
Bacille Calmette-Guérin vaccine 1996;45(No.RR-4):1-18 
Diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis 1991;40(No.RR-10):1-28 
1997;46(No. RR-7) 
Hepatitis B 1991;40(No.RR-13):1-25 
Hepatitis A 1996;45(No.RR-15):1-30 
Influenza* 1997;46(No.RR-9):1-25 
Japanese encephalitis 1993;42(No.RR-1):1-15 
Measles 1989;38(No.S9):1-18 
Measles, mumps, rubella (MMR) 1998;47 (in press) 
Meningococcal disease and outbreaks 1997;46(No.RR-5):1-21 
Mumps 1989;38:388–92, 397–400 
























*Each year influenza vaccine recommendations are reviewed and amended to reflect updated 
information concerning influenza activity in the United States for the preceding influenza 
season and to provide information on the vaccine available for the upcoming influenza season. 
These recommendations are published annually in the MMWR, usually during May or June. 
for both hospital personnel and patients (17 ). The following recommendations con­
cerning vaccines of importance to HCWs should be considered during policy 
development (Table 2). 
   
     
   
   
   
     
      
   
 
    
  
   
  
     
  
       
     
  
  
     
    
     
     
    
     
 
    
    
    
     
   
   
   
    
     
   
    
    
   
3 Vol. 46 / No. RR-18 MMWR 
BACKGROUND 
Diseases for Which Immunization Is Strongly Recommended 
On the basis of documented nosocomial transmission, HCWs are considered to be 
at significant risk for acquiring or transmitting hepatitis B, influenza, measles, mumps, 
rubella, and varicella. All of these diseases are vaccine-preventable. 
Hepatitis B 
Hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection is the major infectious hazard for health-care per­
sonnel. During 1993, an estimated 1,450 workers became infected through exposure 
to blood and serum-derived body fluids, a 90% decrease from the number estimated 
to have been thus infected during 1985 (18–20 ). Data indicate that 5%–10% of HBV-
infected workers become chronically infected. Persons with chronic HBV infection are 
at risk for chronic liver disease (i.e., chronic active hepatitis, cirrhosis, and primary 
hepatocellular carcinoma) and are potentially infectious throughout their lifetimes. An 
estimated 100–200 health-care personnel have died annually during the past decade 
because of the chronic consequences of HBV infection (CDC, unpublished data). 
The risk for acquiring HBV infection from occupational exposures is dependent on 
the frequency of percutaneous and permucosal exposures to blood or body fluids con­
taining blood (21–25 ). Depending on the tasks he or she performs, any health-care or 
public safety worker may be at high risk for HBV exposure. Workers performing tasks 
involving exposure to blood or blood-contaminated body fluids should be vaccinated. 
For public safety workers whose exposure to blood is infrequent, timely postexposure 
prophylaxis may be considered, rather than routine preexposure vaccination. 
In 1987, the Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services issued a Joint 
Advisory Notice regarding protection of employees against workplace exposure to 
HBV and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), and began the process of rulemaking 
to regulate such exposures (26 ). The Federal Standard issued in December, 1991 un­
der the Occupational Safety and Health Act mandates that hepatitis B vaccine be made 
available at the employer’s expense to all health-care personnel who are occupation­
ally exposed to blood or other potentially infectious materials (27 ). Occupational 
exposure is defined as “...reasonably anticipated skin, eye, mucous membrane, or 
parenteral contact with blood or other potentially infectious materials that may result 
from the performance of an employee’s duties (27 ).” The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) follows current ACIP recommendations for its immuni­
zation practices requirements (e.g., preexposure and postexposure antibody testing). 
These regulations have accelerated and broadened the use of hepatitis B vaccine in 
HCWs and have ensured maximal efforts to prevent this occupational disease (23 ).
Prevaccination serologic screening for prior infection is not indicated for persons 
being vaccinated because of occupational risk. Postvaccination testing for antibody to 
hepatitis B surface antigen (anti-HBs) response is indicated for HCWs who have blood 
or patient contact and are at ongoing risk for injuries with sharp instruments or 
needlesticks (e.g., physicians, nurses, dentists, phlebotomists, medical technicians 
and students of these professions). Knowledge of antibody response aids in determin­
ing appropriate postexposure prophylaxis. 
















TABLE 2. Immunizing agents and immunization schedules for health-care workers (HCWs)* 
Primary schedule and Major precautions and 
Generic name booster(s) Indications contraindications Special considerations 
IMMUNIZING AGENTS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED FOR HEALTH-CARE WORKERS 
Hepatitis B (HB) 
recombinant 
vaccine 
Two doses IM 4 weeks 
apart; third dose 5 
months after second; 
booster doses not 
necessary. 
Preexposure: HCWs at risk 
for exposure to blood or 
body fluids. 
Postexposure: See Table 3. 
On the basis of limited data, 
no risk of adverse effects to 
developing fetuses is 
apparent. Pregnancy should 
not be considered a 
contraindication to 
vaccination of women. 
The vaccine produces neither 
therapeutic nor adverse 
effects on HBV-infected 
persons. Prevaccination 
serologic screening is not 
indicated for persons being 
vaccinated because of 
Previous anaphylactic occupational risk. HCWs who 
reaction to common baker’s 
yeast is a contraindication to 
vaccination. 
have contact with patients or 
blood should be tested 1–2 
months after vaccination to 
determine serologic 
response. 
Hepatitis B immune 
globulin (HBIG) 
0.06 mL/kg IM as soon 
as possible after 
exposure. A second 
dose of HBIG should 
be administered 1 
Postexposure prophylaxis 
(Table 3): For persons 
exposed to blood or body 
fluids containing HBsAg and 
who are not immune to HBV 
month later if the HB 
vaccine series has not 
been started. 
infection — 0.06 mL/kg IM as 
soon as possible (but no later 





with current vaccine. 
Administered IM. 
HCWs who have contact with 
patients at high risk for 
influenza or its 
History of anaphylactic 
hypersensitivity to egg 
ingestion. 
No evidence exists of risk to 
mother or fetus when the 
vaccine is administered to a 
split-virus vaccines) complications; HCWs who 
work in chronic care facilities; 
HCWs with high-risk medical 
conditions or who are aged 
≥65 years. 
pregnant woman with an 
underlying high-risk 
condition. Influenza 
vaccination is recommended 
during second and third 
trimesters of pregnancy 






































One dose SC; second 
dose at least 1 month 
HCWs
† 
born during or after 
1957 who do not have 
later. documentation of having 
received 2 doses of live 
vaccine on of after the first 
birthday or a history of 
physician-diagnosed measles 
or serologic evidence of 
immunity. 
Vaccination should be 
considered for all HCWs who 
lack proof of immunity, 








 believed to be 
susceptible can be 
vaccinated. Adults born 
before 1957 can be 
considered immune. 





if recipients are likely to be 
susceptible to rubella and/or 
HIV-infected persons who mumps as well as to 
have evidence of severe measles. Persons vaccinated 
immunosuppression; during 1963–1967 with a 
anaphylaxis after gelatin killed measles vaccine alone, 
ingestion or administration killed vaccine followed by 
of neomycin; recent live vaccine, or with a 
administration of immune vaccine of unknown type 
globulin. should be revaccinated with 
2 doses of live measles virus 
vaccine. 




; history of 
if recipients are likely to be 
susceptible to measles and 
anaphylactic reaction after rubella as well as to mumps. 
gelatin ingestion or 
administration of neomycin. 
*Persons who provide health care to patients or work in institutions that provide patient care, e.g., physicians, nurses, emergency medical 
personnel, dental professionals and students, medical and nursing students, laboratory technicians, hospital volunteers, and adminis­
trative and support staff in health-care institutions 
†All HCWs (i.e., medical or nonmedical, paid or volunteer, full time or part time, student or non-student, with or without patient-care 
responsibilities) who work in health-care institutions (e.g., inpatient and outpatient, public and private) should be immune to measles, 
rubella, and varicella. 
§Persons immunocompromised because of immune deficiency diseases, HIV infection, leukemia, lymphoma or generalized malignancy 
or immunosuppressed as a result of therapy with corticosteroids, alkylating drugs, antimetabolites, or radiation. 
Abbreviations: IM = intramuscular; HBV = hepatitis B virus; HBsAg = hepatitis B surface antigen; SC = subcutaneous; HIV = human 

















    
Primary schedule and  Major precautions and 
Generic name booster(s) Indications contraindications Special considerations 
Rubella live-virus One dose SC; no Indicated for HCWs
†
, both Pregnancy;   The risk for rubella 
vaccine booster men and women, who do not 
have documentation of 
immunocompromised 
†
persons ; history of 
vaccine-associated 
malformations in the 
having received live vaccine anaphylactic reaction after offspring of women pregnant 
 on or after their first birthday administration of neomycin.  when vaccinated or who 
 or laboratory evidence of become pregnant within 3 
immunity. Adults born before  months after vaccination is 
1957, except women who  negligible. Such women 
can become pregnant, can should be counseled 
be considered immune. regarding the theoretical 
basis of concern for the fetus. 
MMR is the vaccine of choice 
if recipients are likely to be 
 susceptible to measles or 
mumps, as well as to rubella. 
Varicella zoster  Two 0.5 mL doses SC Indicated for HCWs
†
 who do Pregnancy, Vaccine is available from the 
live-virus vaccine 4-8 weeks apart if 
≥13 years of age. 
  not have either a reliable 
history of varicella or 
serologic evidence of 
immunocompromised 
§
persons , history of 
anaphylactic reaction 
manufacturer for certain 
patients with acute 
lymphocytic leukemia (ALL) 
immunity. following receipt of in remission. Because 
 neomycin or gelatin. Avoid 71%-93% of persons without 
salicylate use for 6 weeks  a history of varicella are 
after vaccination. immune, serologic testing 
before vaccination is likely to 
be cost-effective. 
Varicella-zoster Persons <50 kg: Persons known or likely to be Serologic testing may help in 
immune globulin 125 u/10 kg IM; susceptible (particularly assessing whether to 




 those at high risk for 
complications, e.g., pregnant 
  administer VZIG. If use of 
VZIG prevents varicella 
women) who have close and disease, patient should be 
prolonged exposure to a vaccinated subsequently. 
contact case or to an 
infectious hospital staff 
 worker or patient. 
6
 





































Bacille Calmette One percutaneous Should be considered only Should not be administered In the United States 
Guérin(BCG) 
Vaccine 
dose of 0.3 mL; no 
booster dose 
for HCWs in areas where 






are directed towards early 
(Tuberculosis) recommended. prevalent, a strong likelihood identification, treatment of 
of infection exists, and where cases, and preventive 
comprehensive infection therapy with isoniazid. 
control precautions have 
failed to prevent TB 
transmission to HCWs. 
OTHER IMMUNOBIOLOGICS THAT ARE OR MAY BE INDICATED FOR HEALTH-CARE WORKERS 
Primary schedule and Indications Major precautions and Special considerations 
Generic name booster(s) contraindications 
Immune globulin Postexposure-One IM Indicated for HCWs exposed Contraindicated in persons Administer in large muscle 
(Hepatitis A) dose of 0.02 mL/kg to feces of infectious patients. with IgA deficiency; do not mass (deltoid, gluteal). 
administered ≤2 weeks administer within 2 weeks 
after exposure. after MMR vaccine, or 3 
weeks after varicella vaccine. 
Delay administration of MMR 
vaccine for ≥3 months and 
varicella vaccine ≥5 months 
after administration of IG. 
* 
Persons who provide health care to patients or work in institutions that provide patient care, e.g., physicians, nurses, emergency medical 
personnel, dental professionals and students, medical and nursing students, laboratory technicians, hospital volunteers, and adminis­
trative and support staff in health-care institutions. 
†All HCWs (i.e., medical or nonmedical, paid or volunteer, full-time or part-time, student or nonstudent, with or without patient-care 
responsibilities) who work in health-care institutions (i.e., inpatient and outpatient, public and private) should be immune to measles, 
rubella, and varicella. 
§Persons immunocompromised because of immune deficiency diseases, HIV infection (who should primarily not receive BCG, OPV, and 
yellow fever vaccines), leukemia, lymphoma or generalized malignancy or immunosuppressed as a result of therapy with corticosteroids, 
alkylating drugs, antimetabolites, or radiation. 
¶Some experts recommend 125 u/10 kg regardless of total body weight.
 
Abbreviations: IM = intramuscular; HCW = health-care worker; TB = tuberculosis; MMR = measles, mumps, rubella vaccine; HAV =
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Primary schedule and  Major precautions and 
Generic name booster(s) Indications contraindications Special considerations 
Hepatitis A vaccine Two doses of vaccine Not routinely indicated for History of anaphylactic 
either 6-12 months 
apart (HAVRIX®), or 6 
HCWs in the United States. 
Persons who work with 




months apart HAV-infected primates or preservative 
(VAQTA®).  with HAV in a research 2-phenoxyethanol. The 
laboratory setting should be safety of the vaccine in 
vaccinated. pregnant women has not 
been determined; the risk 
associated with vaccination 
should be weighed against 
 the risk for hepatitis A in 
women who may be at high 
 risk for exposure to HAV. 
Meningococcal One dose in volume Not routinely indicated for The safety of the vaccine in 
polysaccharide  and by route specified HCWs in the United States. pregnant women has not 
vaccine (tetravalent by manufacturer; need been evaluated; it should not 
 A, C, W135, and Y) for boosters unknown.  be administered during 
pregnancy unless the risk for 
 infection is high. 
Typhoid vaccine, IM vaccine:One 0.5 Workers in microbiology Severe local or systemic Vaccination should not be 
IM, SC, and oral mL dose, booster 0.5 laboratories who frequently  reaction to a previous dose. considered an alternative to 
mL every 2 years. work with Salmonella typhi. Ty21a (oral) vaccine should the use of proper procedures 
SC vaccine: two 0.5  not be administered to when handling specimens 
mL doses, ≥4 weeks 
apart, booster 0.5 mL 
 SC or 0.1 ID every 3 
immunocompromised 
† 
persons  or to persons 
receiving antimicrobial 
and cultures in the laboratory. 








revaccination with the 
entire four-dose series 
every 5 years. 
Vaccinia vaccine	 One dose Laboratory workers who The vaccine is Vaccination may be 
(smallpox)	 administered with a directly handle cultures with contraindicated in pregnancy,  considered for HCWs who 
bifurcated needle; vaccinia, recombinant  in persons with eczema or a have direct contact with 
boosters administered vaccinia viruses, or orthopox history of eczema, and in  contaminated dressings or 
every 10 years. viruses that infect humans. immunocompromised 
persons
†
 and their household 
 other infectious material 
from volunteers in clinical 
contacts. studies involving 
recombinant vaccinia virus. 
OTHER VACCINE-PREVENTABLE DISEASES 
Tetanus and  Two IM doses 4 weeks 
diphtheria (toxoids  apart; third dose 6-12 
All adults. Except in the first trimester, Tetanus prophylaxis in 
§
 pregnancy is not a wound management . 
[Td]) months after second precaution. History of a 
dose; booster every neurologic reaction or 
10 years. immediate hypersensitivity 
reaction after a previous 
dose. History of severe local 
 (Arthus-type) reaction after a 
 previous dose.  Such persons 
 should not receive further 
routine or emergency doses 
of Td for 10 years. 
Pneumococcal One dose, 0.5 mL, IM Adults who are at increased The safety of vaccine in 
polysaccharide or SC; revaccination risk of pneumococcal disease pregnant women has not 
vaccine (23 valent). recommended for and its complications been evaluated; it should not 
those at highest risk because of underlying health  be administered during 
 ≥5 years after the first 
dose. 
conditions; older adults, pregnancy unless the risk for 
especially those age ≥65 who  infection is high. Previous 
are healthy. recipients of any type of 
pneumococcal 
polysaccharide vaccine who 
are at highest risk for fatal 
 infection or antibody loss 
 may be revaccinated ≥5 
years after the first dose. 









 Persons who provide health care to patients or work in institutions that provide patient care, e.g., physicians, nurses, emergency medical 
personnel, dental professionals and students, medical and nursing students, laboratory technicians, hospital volunteers, and adminis­
trative and support staff in health-care institutions. 
†Persons immunocompromised because of immune deficiency diseases, HIV infection, leukemia, lymphoma or generalized malignancy 
or immunosuppressed as a result of therapy with corticosteroids, alkylating drugs, antimetabolites, or radiation. 
§See (15) CDC. Update on adult immunization: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). MMWR 
1991:40(No. RR-12):1–94. 


















    
     
  
    
   
  
    
      




     
   
    
    
    
     
  
   
     
       
     
 
     
    
   
   
  
   
 
  
     
     
    
    
  
    
    
     
     
10 MMWR December 26, 1997 
Vaccine-induced antibodies to HBV decline gradually over time, and ≤60% of per­
sons who initially respond to vaccination will lose detectable antibodies over 12 years 
(28 ; CDC, unpublished data). Studies among adults have demonstrated that, despite 
declining serum levels of antibody, vaccine-induced immunity continues to prevent 
clinical disease or detectable viremic HBV infection (29 ). Therefore, booster doses are 
not considered necessary (1 ). Periodic serologic testing to monitor antibody concen­
trations after completion of the three-dose series is not recommended. The possible 
need for booster doses will be assessed as additional data become available. 
Asymptomatic HBV infections have been detected in vaccinated persons by means 
of serologic testing for antibody to hepatitis B core antigen (anti-HBc) (1 ). However, 
these infections also provide lasting immunity and are not associated with HBV-
related chronic liver disease. 
Influenza 
During community influenza outbreaks, admitting patients infected with influenza 
to hospitals has led to nosocomial transmission of the disease (30,31 ), including 
transmission from staff to patients (32 ). Transmission of influenza among medical 
staff causes absenteeism and considerable disruption of health care (33–36 ; CDC, un­
published data). In addition, influenza outbreaks have caused morbidity and mortality 
in nursing homes (36–41 ). In a recent study of long-term care facilities with uni­
formly high patient influenza vaccination levels, patients in facilities in which >60% of 
the staff had been vaccinated against influenza experienced less influenza-related 
mortality and illness, compared with patients in facilities with no influenza-vaccinated 
staff (42 ). 
Measles, Mumps, and Rubella 
Measles. Nosocomial measles transmission has been documented in the offices of 
private physicians, in emergency rooms, and on hospital wards (43–49 ). Although 
only 3.5% of all cases of measles reported during 1985–1989 occurred in medical set­
tings, the risk for measles infection in medical personnel is estimated to be 
thirteenfold that for the general population (45,49–52 ). During 1990–1991, 1,788 of 
37,429 (4.8%) measles cases were reported to have been acquired in medical settings. 
Of these, 668 (37.4%) occurred among HCWs, 561 (84%) of whom were unvaccinated; 
187 (28%) of these HCWs were hospitalized with measles and three died (CDC, unpub­
lished data). Of the 3,659 measles cases reported during 1992–1995, the setting of 
transmission was known for 2,765; 385 (13.9%) of these cases occurred in medical 
settings (CDC, unpublished data). 
Although birth before 1957 is generally considered acceptable evidence of measles 
immunity, serologic studies of hospital workers indicate that 5%–9% of those born 
before 1957 are not immune to measles (53,54 ). During 1985–1992, 27% of all measles 
cases among HCWs occurred in persons born before 1957 (CDC, unpublished data). 
Mumps. In recent years, a substantial proportion of reported mumps has occurred 
among unvaccinated adolescents and young adults on college campuses and in the 
workplace (55–58 ). Outbreaks of mumps in highly vaccinated populations have been 
attributed to primary vaccine failure (59,60 ). During recent years, the overall incidence 
of mumps has fluctuated only minimally but an increasing proportion of cases has 
been reported in persons aged ≥15 years (61 ). Mumps transmission in medical set­
    
    
  
  
    
      
     
     
  
     
  
 
   
    
     
    
   
   
  
        
  
     
    
    
      
   
   
   
 
   
 
  
   
 
  
11 Vol. 46 / No. RR-18 MMWR 
tings has been reported nationwide (62 , CDC, unpublished data). Programs to ensure 
that medical personnel are immune to mumps are prudent and are easily linked with 
measles and rubella control programs (5 ). 
Rubella. Nosocomial rubella outbreaks involving both HCWs and patients have 
been reported (63 ). Although vaccination has decreased the overall risk for rubella 
transmission in all age groups in the United States by ≥95%, the potential for transmis­
sion in hospital and similar settings persists because 10%–15% of young adults are 
still susceptible (6,64–67 ). In an ongoing study of rubella vaccination in a health main­
tenance organization, 7,890 of 92,070 (8.6%) women aged ≥29 years were susceptible 
to rubella (CDC, unpublished data). Although not as infectious as measles, rubella can 
be transmitted effectively by both males and females. Transmission can occur when­
ever many susceptible persons congregate in one place. Aggressive rubella 
vaccination of susceptible men and women with trivalent measles-mumps-rubella 
(MMR) vaccine can eliminate rubella (as well as measles) transmission (68 ). 
Persons born before 1957 generally are considered to be immune to rubella. How­
ever, findings of seroepidemiologic studies indicate that about 6% of HCWs (including 
persons born in 1957 or earlier) do not have detectable rubella antibody (CDC, unpub­
lished data). 
Varicella 
Nosocomial transmission of varicella zoster virus (VZV) is well recognized (69–80 ). 
Sources for nosocomial exposure of patients and staff have included patients, hospi­
tal staff, and visitors (e.g., the children of hospital employees) who are infected with 
either varicella or zoster. In hospitals, airborne transmission of VZV from persons who 
had varicella or zoster to susceptible persons who had no direct contact with the index 
case-patient has occurred (81–85 ). Although all susceptible hospitalized adults are at 
risk for severe varicella disease and complications, certain patients are at increased 
risk: pregnant women, premature infants born to susceptible mothers, infants born at 
<28 weeks’ gestation or who weigh ≤1000 grams regardless of maternal immune 
status, and immunocompromised persons of all ages (including persons who are 
undergoing immunosuppressive therapy, have malignant disease, or are immuno­
deficient). 
Varicella Control Strategies 
Strategies for managing clusters of VZV infections in hospitals include (16,86–94 ): 
• isolating patients who have varicella and other susceptible patients who are ex­
posed to VZV; 
• controlling air flow; 
• using rapid serologic testing to determine susceptibility; 
• furloughing exposed susceptible personnel or screening these persons daily for 
skin lesions, fever, and systemic symptoms; and 
• temporarily reassigning varicella-susceptible personnel to locations remote from 
patient-care areas. 
      
     
  
     
     
 
   
    
      
      
       
     
   
      
    
   
      
     
    
    
  
     
 
 
   
   
    
      
    
     
   
    
        
  
    
  
   
   
      
      
    
   
  
12 MMWR December 26, 1997 
Appropriate isolation of hospitalized patients who have confirmed or suspected VZV 
infection can reduce the risk for transmission to personnel (95 ). 
Identification of the few persons who are susceptible to varicella when they begin 
employment that involves patient contact is recommended. Only personnel who are 
immune to varicella should care for patients who have confirmed or suspected 
varicella or zoster. 
A reliable history of chickenpox is a valid measure of VZV immunity. Serologic tests 
have been used to assess the accuracy of reported histories of chickenpox 
(76,80,93,95–97 ). Among adults, 97% to 99% of persons with a positive history of 
varicella are seropositive. In addition, the majority of adults with negative or uncertain 
histories are seropositive (range: 71%–93%). Persons who do not have a history of 
varicella or whose history is uncertain can be considered susceptible, or tested se­
rologically to determine their immune status. In health-care institutions, serologic 
screening of personnel who have a negative or uncertain history of varicella is likely 
to be cost effective (8 ). 
If susceptible HCWs are exposed to varicella, they are potentially infective 10–21 
days after exposure. They must often be furloughed during this period, usually at sub­
stantial cost. Persons in whom varicella develops are infective until all lesions dry and 
crust (16,35,96–98 ) (see Other Considerations in Vaccination of Health-Care Work­
ers—Work Restrictions for Susceptible Workers After Exposure). 
Administration of varicella zoster immune globulin (VZIG) after exposure can be 
costly. VZIG does not necessarily prevent varicella, and may prolong the incubation 
period by a week or more, thus extending the time during which personnel should not 
work. 
Breakthrough Infection and Transmission of Vaccine Virus to Contacts 
Varicella virus vaccine protects approximately 70%–90% of recipients against infec­
tion and 95% of recipients against severe disease for at least 7–10 years after 
vaccination. Significant protection is long-lasting. Breakthrough infections (i.e., cases 
of varicella) have occurred among vaccinees after exposure to natural varicella virus. 
Data from all trials in which vaccinees of all ages were actively followed for up to 9 
years indicated that varicella developed in 1%–4.4% of vaccinees per year, depending 
on vaccine lot and time interval since vaccination (Merck and Company, Inc., unpub­
lished data). Unvaccinated persons who contract varicella generally are febrile and 
have several hundred vesicular lesions. Among vaccinees who developed varicella, in 
contrast, the median number of skin lesions was <50 and lesions were less apt to be 
vesicular. Most vaccinated persons who contracted varicella were afebrile, and the 
duration of illness was shorter (Merck and Company, Inc., unpublished data; 99,100 ). 
The rate of transmission of disease from vaccinees who contract varicella is low for 
vaccinated children, but has not been studied in adults. Ten different trials conducted 
during 1981–1989 involved 2,141 vaccinated children. Breakthrough infections oc­
curred in 78 children during the 1–8 year follow-up period of active surveillance, 
resulting in secondary cases in 11 of 90 (12.2%) vaccinated siblings. Among both in­
dex and secondary case-patients, illness was mild. Transmission to a susceptible 
mother from a vaccinated child in whom breakthrough disease occurred also has 
been reported (Merck and Company, Inc., unpublished data; 101 ). 
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Estimates of vaccine efficacy and persistence of antibody in vaccinees are based on 
research conducted before widespread use of varicella vaccine began to influence the 
prevalence of natural VZV infection. Thus, the extent to which boosting from exposure 
to natural virus increases the protection provided by vaccination remains unclear. 
Whether longer-term immunity may wane as the circulation of natural VZV decreases 
also is unknown. 
Risk for transmission of vaccine virus was assessed in placebo recipients who were 
siblings of vaccinated children and among healthy siblings of vaccinated leukemic 
children (102,103 ). The findings of these studies indicate that healthy vaccinated per­
sons have a minimal risk (estimated to be <1%) for transmitting vaccine virus to their 
contacts. This risk may be increased in vaccinees in whom a varicella-like rash devel­
ops after vaccination. Tertiary transmission of vaccine virus to a second healthy 
sibling of a vaccinated leukemic child also has occurred (103 ). 
Several options for managing vaccinated HCWs who may be exposed to varicella 
are available. Routine serologic testing for varicella immunity after administration of 
two doses of vaccine is not considered necessary because 99% of persons become 
seropositive after the second dose. Seroconversion, however, does not always result 
in full protection against disease. Institutional guidelines are needed for management 
of exposed vaccinees who do not have detectable antibody and for those who develop 
clinical varicella. A potentially effective strategy to identify persons who remain at risk 
for varicella is to test vaccinated persons for serologic evidence of immunity immedi­
ately after they are exposed to VZV. Prompt, sensitive, and specific serologic results 
can be obtained at reasonable cost with a commercially available latex agglutination 
(LA) test. Many other methods also have been used to detect antibody to VZV (8). The 
LA test, which uses latex particles coated with VZV glycoprotein antigens, can be com­
pleted in 15 minutes (104,105 ). Persons with detectable antibody are unlikely to 
become infected with varicella. Persons who do not have detectable antibody can be 
retested in 5–6 days. If an anamnestic response is present, these persons are unlikely 
to contract the disease. HCWs who do not have antibody when retested may be fur­
loughed. Alternatively, the clinical status of these persons may be monitored daily and 
they can be furloughed at the onset of manifestations of varicella. 
More information is needed concerning risk for transmission of vaccine virus from 
vaccinees with and without varicella-like rash after vaccination. The risk appears to be 
minimal, and the benefits of vaccinating susceptible HCWs outweigh this potential 
risk. As a safeguard, institutions may wish to consider precautions for personnel in 
whom a rash develops after vaccination and for other vaccinated personnel who will 
have contact with susceptible persons at high risk for serious complications. 
Vaccination should be considered for unvaccinated HCWs who lack documented 
immunity if they are exposed to varicella. However, because the effectiveness of 
postexposure vaccination is unknown, persons vaccinated after an exposure should 
be managed in the manner recommended for unvaccinated persons. 
Tuberculosis and Bacille-Calmette-Guérin Vaccination 
In the United States, Bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG) vaccine has not been recom­
mended for general use because the population risk for infection with Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis (TB) is low and the protective efficacy of BCG vaccine uncertain. The im­
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mune response to BCG vaccine also interferes with use of the tuberculin skin test to 
detect M. tuberculosis infection (7 ). TB prevention and control efforts are focused on 
interrupting transmission from patients who have active infectious TB, skin testing 
those at high risk for TB, and administering preventive therapy when appropriate. 
However, in certain situations, BCG vaccination may contribute to the prevention and 
control of TB when other strategies are inadequate. 
Control of TB 
The fundamental strategies for the prevention and control of TB include: 
• Early detection and effective treatment of patients with active communicable 
TB (106 ). 
• Preventive therapy for infected persons. Identifying and treating persons who are 
infected with M. tuberculosis can prevent the progression of latent infection to 
active infectious disease (107 ). 
• Prevention of institutional transmission. The transmission of TB is a recog­
nized risk in health-care settings and is of particular concern in settings where 
HIV-infected persons work, volunteer, visit, or receive care (108 ). Effective TB 
infection-control programs should be implemented in health-care facilities and 
other institutional settings, (e.g., shelters for homeless persons and correctional 
facilities) (16,109,110 ). 
Role of BCG Vaccination in Prevention of TB Among HCWs 
In a few geographic areas of the United States, increased risks for TB transmission 
in health-care facilities (compared with risks observed in health-care facilities in other 
parts of the United States) occur together with an elevated prevalence among TB pa­
tients of M. tuberculosis strains that are resistant to both isoniazid and rifampin 
(111–116 ). Even in such situations, comprehensive application of infection control 
practices should be the primary strategy used to protect HCWs and others in the facil­
ity from infection with M. tuberculosis. BCG vaccination of HCWs should not be used 
as a primary TB control strategy because a) the protective efficacy of the vaccine in 
HCWs is uncertain; b) even if BCG vaccination is effective for a particular HCW, other 
persons in the health-care facility (e.g., patients, visitors, and other HCWs) are not 
protected against possible exposure to and infection with drug-resistant strains of M. 
tuberculosis; and c) BCG vaccination may complicate preventive therapy because of 
difficulties in distinguishing tuberculin skin test responses caused by infection with M. 
tuberculosis from those caused by the immune response to vaccination. 
Hepatitis C and Other Parenterally Transmitted 
Non-A, Non-B Hepatitis 
Hepatitis C virus (HCV) is the etiologic agent in most cases of parenterally transmit­
ted non-A, non-B hepatitis in the United States (117,118 ). CDC estimates that the 
annual number of newly acquired HCV infections has ranged from 180,000 in 1984 to 
28,000 in 1995. Of these, an estimated 2%–4% occurred among health-care personnel 
who were occupationally exposed to blood. At least 85% of persons who contract HCV 
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infection become chronically infected, and chronic hepatitis develops in an average of 
70% of all HCV-infected persons (117–119 ). Up to 10% of parenterally transmitted 
non-A, non-B hepatitis may be caused by other bloodborne viral agents not yet char­
acterized (non-ABCDE hepatitis) (117,120 ). 
Serologic enzyme immunoassays (EIA) licensed for the detection of antibody to 
HCV (anti-HCV) have evolved since their introduction in 1990 and a third version is 
now available which detects anti-HCV in ≥95% of patients with HCV infection. Interpre­
tation of EIA results is limited by several factors. These assays do not detect anti-HCV 
in all infected persons and do not distinguish among acute, chronic, or resolved infec­
tion. In 80% to 90% of HCV-infected persons, seroconversion occurs an average of 
10–12 weeks after exposure to HCV. These screening assays also yield a high propor­
tion (up to 50%) of falsely positive results when they are used in populations with a 
low prevalence of HCV infection (118,121 ). Although no true confirmatory test has 
been developed, supplemental tests for specificity are available (such as the licensed 
Recombinant Immunoblot Assay [RIBA™ ]), and should always be used to verify re­
peatedly reactive results obtained with screening assays. 
The diagnosis of HCV infection also is possible by detecting HCV RNA with polym­
erase chain reaction (PCR) techniques. Although PCR assays for HCV RNA are 
available from several commercial laboratories on a research-use basis, results vary 
considerably between laboratories. In a recent study in which a reference panel con­
taining known HCV RNA-positive and -negative sera was provided to 86 laboratories 
worldwide (122 ), only 50% were considered to have performed adequately (i.e., by 
failing to detect one weak positive sample), and only 16% reported faultless results. 
Both false-positive and false-negative results can occur from improper collection, han­
dling, and storage of the test samples. In addition, because HCV RNA may be 
detectable only intermittently during the course of infection, a single negative PCR test 
result should not be regarded as conclusive. Tests also have been developed to quan­
titate HCV RNA in serum; however, the applicability of these tests in the clinical setting 
has not been determined. 
Most HCV transmission is associated with direct percutaneous exposure to blood, 
and HCWs are at occupational risk for acquiring this viral infection (123–131 ). The 
prevalence of anti-HCV among hospital-based HCWs and surgeons is about 1%(125– 
128 ) and 2% among oral surgeons (129,130 ). In follow-up studies of HCWs who 
sustained percutaneous exposures to blood from anti-HCV positive patients through 
unintentional needlesticks or sharps injuries, the average incidence of anti-HCV sero­
conversion was 1.8% (range: 0%–7%) (132–137 ). In the only study that used PCR to 
measure HCV infection by detecting HCV RNA, the incidence of postinjury infection 
was 10% (136 ). Although these follow-up studies have not documented transmission 
associated with mucous membrane or nonintact skin exposures, one case report de­
scribes the transmission of HCV from a blood splash to the conjunctiva (138 ). 
Several studies have examined the effectiveness of prophylaxis with immune 
globulins (IGs) in preventing posttransfusion non-A, non-B hepatitis (139–141 ). The 
findings of these studies are difficult to compare and interpret, because of lack of uni­
formity in diagnostic criteria, mixed sources of donors (volunteer and commercial), 
and differing study designs (some studies lacked blinding and placebo controls). In 
some of these studies, IGs appeared to reduce the rate of clinical disease but not over­
all infection rates. In one study, data indicated that chronic hepatitis was less likely to 
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develop in patients who received IG (139 ). None of these data have been reanalyzed 
since anti-HCV testing became available. In only one study was the first dose of IG 
administered after, rather than before, the exposure; the value of IG for postexposure 
prophylaxis is thus difficult to assess. The heterogeneous nature of HCV and its ability 
to undergo rapid mutation, however, appear to prevent development of an effective 
neutralizing immune response (142 ), suggesting that postexposure prophylaxis using 
IG is likely to be ineffective. Furthermore, IG is now manufactured from plasma that 
has been screened for anti-HCV. In an experimental study in which IG manufactured 
from anti-HCV negative plasma was administered to chimpanzees one hour after ex­
posure to HCV, the IG did not prevent infection or disease (143 ). 
The prevention of HCV infection with antiviral agents (e.g., alpha interferon) has not 
been studied. Although alpha interferon therapy is safe and effective for the treatment 
of chronic hepatitis C (144 ), the mechanisms of the effect are poorly understood. In­
terferon may be effective only in the presence of an established infection (145 ). 
Interferon must be administered by injection and may cause side effects. Based on 
these considerations, antiviral agents are not recommended for postexposure pro­
phylaxis of HCV infection. 
In the absence of effective prophylaxis, persons who have been exposed to HCV 
may benefit from knowing their infection status so they can seek evaluation for 
chronic liver disease and treatment. Sustained response rates to alpha interferon ther­
apy generally are low (10%–20% in the United States). The occurrence of mild to 
moderate side effects in most patients has required discontinuation of therapy in up 
to 15% of patients. No clinical, demographic, serum biochemical, serologic, or his­
tologic features have been identified that reliably predict which patients will sustain a 
long-term remission in response to alpha interferon therapy. 
Several studies indicate that interferon treatment begun early in the course of HCV 
infection is associated with an increased rate of resolved infection. Onset of HCV infec­
tion among HCWs after exposure could be detected earlier by using PCR to detect HCV 
RNA than by using EIA to measure anti-HCV. However, PCR is not a licensed assay and 
its accuracy is highly variable. In addition, no data are available which indicate that 
treatment begun early in the course of chronic HCV infection is less effective than 
treatment begun during the acute phase of infection. Furthermore, alpha interferon is 
approved for the treatment of chronic hepatitis C only. 
IG or antiviral agents are not recommended for postexposure prophylaxis of hepa­
titis C. No vaccine against hepatitis C is available. Health-care institutions should 
consider implementing policies and procedures to monitor HCWs for HCV infection 
after percutaneous or permucosal exposures to blood (146 ). At a minimum, such poli­
cies should include: 
• For the source, baseline serologic testing for anti-HCV; 
• For the person exposed to an anti-HCV positive source, baseline and follow-up 
(e.g., 6 months) serologic testing for anti-HCV and alanine aminotransferase 
activity; 
• Confirmation by supplemental anti-HCV testing of all anti-HCV results reported 
as repeatedly reactive by EIA; 
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• Education of HCWs about the risk for and prevention of occupational transmis­
sion of all blood borne pathogens, including hepatitis C, using up-to-date and 
accurate information. 
Other Diseases for Which Immunization of Health-Care 
Workers Is or May Be Indicated 
Diseases are included in this section for one of the following reasons: 
• Nosocomial transmission occurs, but HCWs are not at increased risk as a result 
of occupational exposure (i.e., hepatitis A), 
• Occupational risk may be high, but protection via active or passive immunization 
is not available (i.e., pertussis), or 
• Vaccines are available but are not routinely recommended for all HCWs or are 
recommended only in certain situations (i.e., vaccinia and meningococcal vac­
cines). 
Hepatitis A 
Occupational exposure generally does not increase HCWs’ risk for hepatitis A virus 
(HAV) infection. When proper infection control practices are followed, nosocomial 
HAV transmission is rare. Outbreaks caused by transmission of HAV to neonatal inten­
sive care unit staff by infants infected through transfused blood have occasionally 
been observed (147–149 ). Transmission of HAV from adult patients to HCWs is usually 
associated with fecal incontinence in the patients. However, most patients hospital­
ized with hepatitis A are admitted after onset of jaundice, when they are beyond the 
point of peak infectivity (150 ). Serologic surveys among many types of HCWs have 
not identified an elevated prevalence of HAV infection compared with other occupa­
tional populations (151–153 ). 
Two specific prophylactic measures are available for protection against hepatitis 
A—administration of immune globulin (IG) and hepatitis A vaccine. When adminis­
tered within 2 weeks after an exposure, IG is >85% effective in preventing hepatitis 
A (2 ). Two inactivated hepatitis A vaccines, which can provide long-term preexposure 
protection, were recently licensed in the United States: HAVRIX® (manufactured by 
SmithKline Beecham Biologicals) and VAQTA® (manufactured by Merck & Company, 
Inc.) (2 ). The efficacy of these vaccines in preventing clinical disease ranges from 94% 
to 100%. Data indicate that the duration of clinical protection conferred by VAQTA® is 
at least 3 years, and that conferred by HAVRIX® at least 4 years. Mathematical models 
of antibody decay indicate that protection conferred by vaccination may last up to 20 
years (2 ). 
Meningococcal Disease 
Nosocomial transmission of Neisseria meningitidis is uncommon. In rare in­
stances, direct contact with respiratory secretions of infected persons (e.g., during 
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation) has resulted in transmission from patients with menin­
gococcemia or meningococcal meningitis to HCWs. Although meningococcal lower 
respiratory infections are rare, HCWs may be at increased risk for meningococcal in­
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fection if exposed to N. meningitidis-infected patients with active productive coughs. 
HCWs can decrease the risk for infection by adhering to precautions to prevent expo­
sure to respiratory droplets (16,95 ). 
Postexposure prophylaxis is advised for persons who have had intensive, unpro­
tected contact (i.e., without wearing a mask) with infected patients (e.g., intubating, 
resuscitating, or closely examining the oropharynx of patients)(16 ). Antimicrobial 
prophylaxis can eradicate carriage of N. meningitidis and prevent infections in per­
sons who have unprotected exposure to patients with meningococcal infections (9 ). 
Rifampin is effective in eradicating nasopharyngeal carriage of N. meningitidis, but is 
not recommended for pregnant women, because the drug is teratogenic in laboratory 
animals. Ciprofloxacin and ceftriaxone in single-dose regimens are also effective in 
reducing nasopharyngeal carriage of N. meningitidis, and are reasonable alternatives 
to the multidose rifampin regimen (9 ). Ceftriaxone also can be used during preg­
nancy. 
Although useful for controlling outbreaks of serogroup C meningococcal disease, 
administration of quadrivalent A,C,Y,W-135 meningococcal polysaccharide vaccines is 
of little benefit for postexposure prophylaxis (9 ). The serogroups A and C vaccines, 
which have demonstrated estimated efficacies of 85%–100% in older children and 
adults, are useful for control of epidemics (9 ). The decision to implement mass vacci­
nation to prevent serogroup C meningococcal disease depends on whether the 
occurrence of more than one case of the disease represents an outbreak or an unusual 
clustering of endemic meningococcal disease. Surveillance for serogroup C disease 
and calculation of attack rates can be used to identify outbreaks and determine 
whether use of meningococcal vaccine is warranted. Recommendations for evaluat­
ing and managing suspected serogroup C meningococcal disease outbreaks have 
been published (9 ). 
Pertussis 
Pertussis is highly contagious. Secondary attack rates among susceptible house­
hold contacts exceed 80% (154,155 ). Transmission occurs by direct contact with 
respiratory secretions or large aerosol droplets from the respiratory tract of infected 
persons. The incubation period is generally 7–10 days. The period of communicability 
starts with the onset of the catarrhal stage and extends into the paroxysmal stage. 
Vaccinated adolescents and adults, whose immunity wanes 5–10 years after the last 
dose of vaccine (usually administered at age 4–6 years), are an important source of 
pertussis infection for susceptible infants. The disease can be transmitted from adult 
patients to close contacts, especially unvaccinated children. Such transmission may 
occur in households and hospitals. 
Transmission of pertussis in hospital settings has been documented in several 
reports (156–159 ). Transmission has occurred from a hospital visitor, from hospital 
staff to patients, and from patients to hospital staff. Although of limited size (range: 
2–17 patients and 5–13 staff), documented outbreaks were costly and disruptive. In 
each outbreak, larger numbers of staff were evaluated for cough illness and required 
nasopharyngeal cultures, serologic tests, prophylactic antibiotics, and exclusion from 
work. 
During outbreaks that occur in hospitals, the risk for contracting pertussis among 
patients or staff is often difficult to quantify because exposure is not well defined. 
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Serologic studies conducted among hospital staff during two outbreaks indicate that 
exposure to pertussis is much more frequent than the attack rates of clinical disease 
indicate (154,156–159 ). Seroprevalence of pertussis agglutinating antibodies corre­
lated with the degree of patient contact and was highest among pediatric house staff 
(82%) and ward nurses (71%), lowest among nurses with administrative responsibili­
ties (35%) (158 ). 
Prevention of pertussis transmission in health-care settings involves diagnosis and 
early treatment of clinical cases, respiratory isolation of infectious patients who are 
hospitalized, exclusion from work of staff who are infectious, and postexposure pro­
phylaxis. Early diagnosis of pertussis, before secondary transmission occurs, is 
difficult because the disease is highly communicable during the catarrhal stage, when 
symptoms are still nonspecific. Pertussis should be one of the differential diagnoses 
for any patient with an acute cough illness of ≥7 days duration without another appar­
ent cause, particularly if characterized by paroxysms of coughing, posttussive 
vomiting, whoop, or apnea. Nasopharyngeal cultures should be obtained if possible. 
Precautions to prevent respiratory droplet transmission or spread by close or direct 
contact should be employed in the care of patients admitted to hospital with sus­
pected or confirmed pertussis (95 ). These precautions should remain in effect until 
patients are clinically improved and have completed at least 5 days of appropriate 
antimicrobial therapy. HCWs in whom symptoms (i.e., unexplained rhinitis or acute 
cough) develop after known pertussis exposure may be at risk for transmitting pertus­
sis and should be excluded from work (16 )(see Other Considerations in Vaccination of 
Health-Care Workers—Work Restrictions for Susceptible Workers After Exposure). 
One acellular pertussis vaccine is immunogenic in adults, but does not increase risk 
for adverse events when administered with tetanus and diphtheria (Td) toxoids, as 
compared with administration of Td alone (160 ). Recommendations for use of li­
censed diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and acellular pertussis (DTaP) vaccines among 
infants and young children have been published (161 ). If acellular pertussis vaccines 
are licensed for use in adults in the future, booster doses of adult formulations of 
acellular pertussis vaccines may be recommended to prevent the occurrence and 
spread of the disease in adults, including HCWs. However, acellular pertussis vaccines 
combined with diphtheria and tetanus toxoids (DTaP) will need to be reformulated for 
use in adults, because all infant formulations contain more diphtheria toxoid than is 
recommended for persons aged ≥7 years. Recommendations regarding routine vacci­
nation of adults will require additional studies (e.g., studies of the incidence, severity, 
and cost of pertussis among adults; studies of the efficacy and safety of adult formu­
lations of DTaP; and studies of the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of a strategy of 
adult vaccination, particularly for HCWs). 
Typhoid 
The incidence of typhoid fever declined steadily in the United States from 1900 to 
1960 and has remained at a low level. During 1985–1994, the average number of cases 
reported annually was 441 (CDC, unpublished data). The median age of persons with 
cases of typhoid was 24 years; 53% were male. Nearly three quarters of patients in­
fected with Salmonella typhi reported foreign travel during the 30 days before onset 
of symptoms. During this ten year period, several cases of laboratory-acquired 
typhoid fever were reported among microbiology laboratory workers, only one of 
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whom had been vaccinated (162 ). S. typhi and other enteric pathogens may be noso­
comially transmitted via the hands of personnel who are infected. Generally, personal 
hygiene, particularly hand washing before and after all patient contacts, will minimize 
risk for transmitting enteric pathogens to patients. If HCWs contract an acute diarrheal 
illness accompanied by fever, cramps, or bloody stools, they are likely to be excreting 
large numbers of infective organisms in their feces. Excluding these workers from 
care of patients until the illness has been evaluated and treated will prevent trans­
mission (16 ). 
Vaccinia 
Vaccinia (smallpox) vaccine is a highly effective immunizing agent that brought 
about the global eradication of smallpox. In 1976, routine vaccinia vaccination of 
HCWs in the United States was discontinued. More recently, ACIP recommended use 
of vaccinia vaccine to protect laboratory workers from orthopoxvirus infection (10 ). 
Because studies of recombinant vaccinia virus vaccines have advanced to the stage of 
clinical trials, some physicians and nurses may now be exposed to vaccinia and re­
combinant vaccinia viruses. Vaccinia vaccination of these persons should be 
considered in selected instances (e.g., for HCWs who have direct contact with con­
taminated dressings or other infectious material). 
Other Vaccine-Preventable Diseases 
HCWs are not at greater risk for diphtheria, tetanus, and pneumococcal disease 
than the general population. ACIP recommends that all adults be protected against 
diphtheria and tetanus, and recommends pneumococcal vaccination of all persons 
aged ≥65 years and of younger persons who have certain medical conditions 
(see Recommendations). 
Immunizing Immunocompromised Health-Care Workers 
A physician must assess the degree to which an individual health-care worker is 
immunocompromised. Severe immunosuppression can be the result of congenital 
immunodeficiency; HIV infection; leukemia; lymphoma; generalized malignancy; or 
therapy with alkylating agents, antimetabolites, radiation, or large amounts of corti­
costeroids. All persons affected by some of these conditions are severely 
immunocompromised, whereas for other conditions (e.g., HIV infection), disease pro­
gression or treatment stage determine the degree of immunocompromise. A 
determination that an HCW is severely immunocompromised ultimately must be 
made by his or her physician. Immunocompromised HCWs and their physicians 
should consider the risk for exposure to a vaccine-preventable disease together with 
the risks and benefits of vaccination. 
Corticosteroid Therapy 
The exact amount of systemically absorbed corticosteroids and the duration of ad­
ministration needed to suppress the immune system of an otherwise healthy person 
are not well defined. Most experts agree that steroid therapy usually does not contra-
indicate administration of live virus vaccines such as MMR and its component 
vaccines when therapy is a) short term (i.e., <14 days) low to moderate dose; b) low to 
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moderate dose administered daily or on alternate days; c) long-term alternate day 
treatment with short-acting preparations; d) maintenance physiologic doses (replace­
ment therapy); or e) administered topically (skin or eyes), by aerosol, or by 
intra-articular, bursal, or tendon injection. Although the immunosuppressive effects of 
steroid treatment vary, many clinicians consider a steroid dose that is equivalent to or 
greater than a prednisone dose of 20 mg per day sufficiently immunosuppressive to 
cause concern about the safety of administering live virus vaccines. Persons who have 
received systemic corticosteroids in excess of this dose daily or on alternate days for 
an interval of ≥14 days should avoid vaccination with MMR and its component vac­
cines for at least 1 month after cessation of steroid therapy. Persons who have 
received prolonged or extensive topical, aerosol, or other local corticosteroid therapy 
that causes clinical or laboratory evidence of systemic immunosuppression also 
should not receive MMR, its component vaccines, and varicella vaccine for at least 1 
month after cessation of therapy. Persons who receive corticosteroid doses equivalent 
to ≥20 mg per day or prednisone during an interval of <14 days generally can receive 
MMR or its component vaccines immediately after cessation of treatment, although 
some experts prefer waiting until 2 weeks after completion of therapy. Persons who 
have a disease that, in itself, suppresses the immune response and who are also re­
ceiving either systemic or locally administered corticosteroids generally should not 
receive MMR, its component vaccines, or varicella vaccine. 
HIV-Infected Persons 
In general, symptomatic HIV-infected persons have suboptimal immunologic 
responses to vaccines (163–167 ). The response to both live and killed antigens may 
decrease as the disease progresses (167 ). Administration of higher doses of vaccine 
or more frequent boosters to HIV-infected persons may be considered. However, 
because neither the initial immune response to higher doses of vaccine nor the per­
sistence of antibody in HIV-infected patients has been systematically evaluated, 
recommendations cannot be made at this time. 
Limited studies of MMR immunization in both asymptomatic and symptomatic HIV-
infected patients who did not have evidence of severe immunosuppression 
documented no serious or unusual adverse events after vaccination (168 ). HIV-
infected persons are at increased risk for severe complications if infected with mea­
sles. Therefore, MMR vaccine is recommended for all asymptomatic HIV-infected 
HCWs who do not have evidence of severe immunosuppression. Administration of 
MMR to HIV-infected HCWs who are symptomatic but do not have evidence of severe 
immunosuppression also should be considered. However, measles vaccine is not 
recommended for HIV-infected persons who have evidence of severe immunosup­
pression because a) a case of progressive measles pneumonia has been reported after 
administration of MMR vaccine to a person with AIDS and severe immunosuppres­
sion (169 ), b) the incidence of measles in the United States is currently very low (170), 
c) vaccination-related morbidity has been reported in severely immunocompromised 
persons who were not HIV-infected (171 ), and d) a diminished antibody response 
to measles vaccination occurs among severely immunocompromised HIV-infected 
persons (172 ). 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendations for administration of vaccines and other immunobiologic 
agents to HCWs are organized in three broad disease categories: 
• those for which active immunization is strongly recommended because of spe­
cial risks for HCWs (i.e., hepatitis B, influenza, measles, mumps, rubella, and 
varicella); 
• those for which active and/or passive immunization of HCWs may be indicated in 
certain circumstances (i.e., tuberculosis, hepatitis A, meningococcal disease, ty­
phoid fever, and vaccinia) or in the future (i.e.,pertussis); and 
• those for which immunization of all adults is recommended (i.e., tetanus, diph­
theria, and pneumococcal disease). 
Immunization Is Strongly Recommended 
ACIP strongly recommends that all HCWs be vaccinated against (or have docu­
mented immunity to) hepatitis B, influenza, measles, mumps, rubella, and varicella 
(Table 2). Specific recommendations for use of vaccines and other immunobiologics 
to prevent these diseases among HCWs follow. 
Hepatitis B 
Any HCW who performs tasks involving contact with blood, blood-contaminated 
body fluids, other body fluids, or sharps should be vaccinated. Hepatitis B vaccine 
should always be administered by the intramuscular route in the deltoid muscle with 
a needle 1–1.5 inches long. 
Among health-care professionals, risks for percutaneous and permucosal expo­
sures to blood vary during the training and working career of each person but are 
often highest during the professional training period. Therefore, vaccination should 
be completed during training in schools of medicine, dentistry, nursing, laboratory 
technology, and other allied health professions, before trainees have contact with 
blood. In addition, the OSHA Federal Standard requires employers to offer hepatitis B 
vaccine free of charge to employees who are occupationally exposed to blood or other 
potentially infectious materials (27 ). 
Prevaccination serologic screening for previous infection is not indicated for per­
sons being vaccinated because of occupational risk unless the hospital or health-care 
organization considers screening cost-effective. Postexposure prophylaxis with hepa­
titis B immune globulin (HBIG) (passive immunization) and/or vaccine (active 
immunization) should be used when indicated (e.g., after percutaneous or mucous 
membrane exposure to blood known or suspected to be HBsAg-positive [Table 3]). 
Needlestick or other percutaneous exposures of unvaccinated persons should lead 
to initiation of the hepatitis B vaccine series. Postexposure prophylaxis should be con­
sidered for any percutaneous, ocular, or mucous membrane exposure to blood in the 
workplace and is determined by the HBsAg status of the source and the vaccination 
and vaccine-response status of the exposed person (Table 3)(1,18 ). 
If the source of exposure is HBsAg-positive and the exposed person is unvacci­
nated, HBIG also should be administered as soon as possible after exposure 
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TABLE 3. Recommended postexposure prophylaxis for percutaneous or permucosal 
exposure to hepatitis B virus, United States 
Vaccination and anti­
 Treatment when source is 
body response status Source not tested or 
of exposed person HBsAG* positive  HBsAg negative status unknown 
Unvaccinated HBIG† x 1; initiate HB Initiate HB vaccine Initiate HB vaccine 
vaccine series § series series 
Previously vaccinated: 
Known responder¶ No treatment No treatment No treatment 
Known non-responder  HBIG x 2 or No treatment If known high-risk 
HBIG x 1 and initiate source, treat as if 
revaccination source were HBsAg 
positive 
Antibody response Test exposed person No treatment Test exposed person 
unknown for anti-HBs** for anti-HBs 
1. If adequate¶, no 1. If adequate¶, no
  treatment   treatment 
2. If inadequate¶, HBIG 2. If inadequate¶,
  x 1 and vaccine   initiate revaccination 
 booster 
*Hepatitis B surface antigen.




¶Responder is defined as a person with adequate levels of serum antibody to hepatitis B
 
surface antigen (i.e., anti-HBs ≥ 10 mIU/mL); inadequate response to vaccination defined as 
serum anti-HBs < 10 mIU/mL. 
**Antibody to hepatitis B surface antigen. 
(preferably within 24 hours) and the vaccine series started. The effectiveness of HBIG 
when administered >7 days after percutaneous or permucosal exposures is unknown. 
If the exposed person had an adequate antibody response (≥10 mIU/mL) documented 
after vaccination, no testing or treatment is needed, although administration of a 
booster dose of vaccine can be considered. 
One to 2 months after completion of the 3-dose vaccination series, HCWs who have 
contact with patients or blood and are at ongoing risk for injuries with sharp instru­
ments or needlesticks should be tested for antibody to hepatitis B surface antigen 
(anti-HBs). Persons who do not respond to the primary vaccine series should com­
plete a second three-dose vaccine series or be evaluated to determine if they are 
HBsAg-positive. Revaccinated persons should be retested at the completion of the 
second vaccine series. Persons who prove to be HBsAg-positive should be counseled 
accordingly (1,16,121,173 ). Primary non-responders to vaccination who are HBsAg­
negative should be considered susceptible to HBV infection and should be counseled 
regarding precautions to prevent HBV infection and the need to obtain HBIG prophy­
laxis for any known or probable parenteral exposure to HBsAg-positive blood 
(Table 3). Booster doses of hepatitis B vaccine are not considered necessary, and peri­
odic serologic testing to monitor antibody concentrations after completion of the 
vaccine series is not recommended. 
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Influenza 
To reduce staff illnesses and absenteeism during the influenza season and to re­
duce the spread of influenza to and from workers and patients, the following HCWs 
should be vaccinated in the fall of each year: 
• Persons who attend patients at high risk for complications of influenza (whether 
the care is provided at home or in a health-care facility) (3 ); 
• Persons aged ≥65 years; and 
• Persons with certain chronic medical conditions (e.g., persons who have chronic 
disorders of the cardiovascular or pulmonary systems; persons who required 
medical follow-up or hospitalization within the preceding year because of chronic 
metabolic disease [including diabetes], renal dysfunction, hemoglobinopathies, 
or immunosuppression [including HIV infection]). 
• Pregnant women who will be in the second or third trimester of pregnancy dur­
ing influenza season. 
Measles, Mumps, and Rubella 
Persons who work within medical facilities should be immune to measles and ru­
bella. Immunity to mumps is highly desirable for all HCWs. Because any HCW (i.e., 
medical or nonmedical, paid or volunteer, full time or part time, student or nonstu­
dent, with or without patient-care responsibilities) who is susceptible can, if exposed, 
contract and transmit measles or rubella, all medical institutions (e.g., inpatient and 
outpatient, public and private) should ensure that those who work within their facili­
ties* are immune to measles and rubella. Likewise, HCWs have a responsibility to 
avoid causing harm to patients by preventing transmission of these diseases. 
Persons born in 1957 or later can be considered immune to measles, mumps, or 
rubella† only if they have documentation of a) physician-diagnosed measles or 
mumps disease; or b) laboratory evidence of measles, mumps, or rubella immunity 
(persons who have an “indeterminate” level of immunity upon testing should be con­
sidered nonimmune); or c) appropriate vaccination against measles, mumps, and 
rubella (i.e., administration on or after the first birthday of two doses of live measles 
vaccine separated by ≥28 days, at least one dose of live mumps vaccine, and at least 
one dose of live rubella vaccine). 
Although birth before 1957 generally is considered acceptable evidence of measles 
and rubella immunity, health-care facilities should consider recommending a dose of 
MMR vaccine to unvaccinated workers born before 1957 who are in either of the fol­
lowing categories: a) those who do not have a history of measles disease or 
laboratory evidence of measles immunity, and b) those who lack laboratory evidence 
of rubella immunity. Rubella vaccination or laboratory evidence of rubella immunity is 
particularly important for female HCWs born before 1957 who can become pregnant. 
*A possible exception might be an outpatient facility that deals exclusively with elderly patients 
considered at low risk for measles. 
†Birth before 1957 is not acceptable evidence of rubella immunity for women who can become 
pregnant because rubella can occur in some unvaccinated persons born before 1957 and 
because congenital rubella syndrome can occur in offspring of women infected with rubella 
during pregnancy. 
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Serologic screening need not be done before vaccinating against measles and ru­
bella unless the health-care facility considers it cost-effective (174–176 ). Serologic 
testing is not necessary for persons who have documentation of appropriate vaccina­
tion or other acceptable evidence of immunity to measles and rubella. Serologic 
testing before vaccination is appropriate only if tested persons identified as nonim­
mune are subsequently vaccinated in a timely manner, and should not be done if the 
return and timely vaccination of those screened cannot be ensured (176 ). Likewise, 
during outbreaks of measles, rubella, or mumps, serologic screening before vaccina­
tion is not recommended because rapid vaccination is necessary to halt disease 
transmission. 
Measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) trivalent vaccine is the vaccine of choice. If the re­
cipient has acceptable evidence of immunity to one or more of the components, 
monovalent or bivalent vaccines may be used. MMR or its component vaccines 
should not be administered to women known to be pregnant. For theoretical reasons, 
a risk to the fetus from administration of live virus vaccines cannot be excluded. 
Therefore, women should be counseled to avoid pregnancy for 30 days after admini­
stration of monovalent measles or mumps vaccines and for 3 months after 
administration of MMR or other rubella-containing vaccines. Routine precautions for 
vaccinating postpubertal women with MMR or its component vaccines include a) ask­
ing if they are or may be pregnant, b) not vaccinating those who say they are or may 
be pregnant, and c) vaccinating those who state that they are not pregnant after the 
potential risk to the fetus is explained. If a pregnant woman is vaccinated or if a 
woman becomes pregnant within 3 months after vaccination, she should be coun­
seled about the theoretical basis of concern for the fetus, but MMR vaccination during 
pregnancy should not ordinarily be a reason to consider termination of pregnancy. 
Rubella-susceptible women from whom vaccine is withheld because they state they 
are or may be pregnant should be counseled about the potential risk for congenital 
rubella syndrome and the importance of being vaccinated as soon as they are no 
longer pregnant. Measles vaccine is not recommended for HIV-infected persons with 
evidence of severe immunosuppression (see Vaccination of HIV-Infected Persons). 
Varicella 
All HCWs should ensure that they are immune to varicella. Varicella immunization 
is particularly recommended for susceptible HCWs who have close contact with per­
sons at high risk for serious complications, including a) premature infants born to 
susceptible mothers, b) infants who are born at <28 weeks of gestation or who weigh 
≤1,000 g at birth (regardless of maternal immune status), c) pregnant women, and d) 
immunocompromised persons. 
Serologic screening for varicella immunity need not be done before vaccinating 
unless the health-care institution considers it cost-effective. Routine postvaccination 
testing of HCWs for antibodies to varicella is not recommended because ≥90% of vac­
cinees are seropositive after the second dose of vaccine. 
Hospitals should develop guidelines for management of vaccinated HCWs who are 
exposed to natural varicella. Seroconversion after varicella vaccination does not al­
ways result in full protection against disease. Therefore, the following measures 
should be considered for HCWs who are exposed to natural varicella: a) serologic test­
ing for varicella antibody immediately after VZV exposure; b) retesting 5–6 days later 
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to determine if an anamnestic response is present; and c) possible furlough or re­
assignment of personnel who do not have detectable varicella antibody. Whether 
postexposure vaccination protects adults is not known. 
Hospitals also should develop guidelines for managing HCWs after varicella vacci­
nation because of the risk for transmission of vaccine virus. Institutions may wish to 
consider precautions for personnel in whom a rash develops after vaccination and for 
other vaccinated HCWs who will have contact with susceptible persons at high risk for 
serious complications. 
Hepatitis C and Other Parenterally Transmitted Non-A, Non-B 
Hepatitis 
No vaccine or other immunoprophylactic measures are available for hepatitis C or 
other parenterally transmitted non-A, non-B hepatitis. HCWs should follow recom­
mended practices for preventing transmission of all blood borne pathogens (see 
Background—Hepatitis C and other Parenterally Transmitted Non-A, Non-B Hepatitis). 
Other Diseases for Which Immunoprophylaxis Is or May Be 
Indicated 
ACIP does not recommend routine immunization of HCWs against tuberculosis, 
hepatitis A, pertussis, meningococcal disease, typhoid fever, or vaccinia. However, im­
munoprophylaxis for these diseases may be indicated for HCWs in certain 
circumstances. 
Tuberculosis and BCG Vaccination of Health-Care Workers in High-Risk 
Settings 
BCG vaccination of HCWs should be considered on an individual basis in health-
care settings where all of the following conditions are met: 
• a high percentage of TB patients are infected with M. tuberculosis strains that are 
resistant to both isoniazid and rifampin; and 
• transmission of such drug-resistant M. tuberculosis strains to HCWs is likely; 
and, 
•	 comprehensive TB infection-control precautions have been implemented and 
have not been successful. 
Vaccination with BCG should not be required for employment or for assignment in 
specific work areas. 
BCG is not recommended for use in HIV-infected persons or persons who are oth­
erwise immunocompromised. In health-care settings where there is a high risk for 
transmission of M. tuberculosis strains resistant to both isoniazid and rifampin, em­
ployees and volunteers who are infected with HIV or are otherwise immuno­
compromised should be fully informed about the risk for acquiring TB infection and 
disease and the even greater risk for development of active TB disease associated 
with immunosuppression. 
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HCWs considered for BCG vaccination should be counseled regarding the risks and 
benefits of both BCG vaccination and preventive therapy. They should be informed 
about the variable findings of research regarding the efficacy of BCG vaccination, the 
interference of BCG vaccination with diagnosis of newly acquired M. tuberculosis in­
fection, and the possible serious complications of BCG vaccine in 
immunocompromised persons, especially those infected with HIV. They also should 
be informed about the lack of data regarding the efficacy of preventive therapy for M. 
tuberculosis infections caused by strains resistant to isoniazid and rifampin and the 
risks for drug toxicity associated with multidrug preventive-therapy regimens. If re­
quested by the employee, employers should offer (but not compel) a work assignment 
in which an immunocompromised HCW would have the lowest possible risk for infec­
tion with M. tuberculosis. 
HCWs who contract TB are a source of infection for other health-care personnel and 
patients. Immunocompromised persons are at increased risk for developing active 
disease after exposure to TB; therefore, managers of health-care facilities should 
develop written policies to limit activities that might result in exposure of immuno­
compromised employees to persons with active cases of TB. 
BCG vaccination is not recommended for HCWs in low-risk settings. In most areas 
of the United States, most M. tuberculosis isolates (approximately 90%) are fully sus­
ceptible to isoniazid or rifampin or both, and the risk for TB transmission in health-care 
facilities is very low if adequate infection control practices are maintained. 
Hepatitis A 
Routine preexposure hepatitis A vaccination of HCWs and routine IG prophylaxis 
for hospital personnel providing care to patients with hepatitis A are not indicated. 
Rather, sound hygienic practices should be emphasized. Staff education should em­
phasize precautions regarding direct contact with potentially infective materials (e.g., 
hand washing). 
In documented outbreaks of hepatitis A, administration of IG to persons who have 
close contact with infected patients (e.g., HCWs, other patients) is recommended. A 
single intramuscular dose (0.02 mL per kg) of IG is recommended as soon as possible 
and ≤2 weeks after exposure (2 ). The usefulness of hepatitis A vaccine in controlling 
outbreaks in health-care settings has not been investigated. 
The following vaccination schedules are recommended for the vaccines available 
in the United States: 
• HAVRIX®: for persons aged >18 years, two doses, the second administered 6–12 
months after the first. 
• VAQTA® : for persons aged >17 years, two doses, the second administered 6 
months after the first. 
Meningococcal Disease 
Routine vaccination of civilians, including HCWs, is not recommended. HCWs who 
have intensive contact with oropharyngeal secretions of infected patients, and who do 
not use proper precautions (95 ) should receive antimicrobial prophylaxis with ri­
fampin (or sulfonamides, if the organisms isolated are sulfonamide-sensitive). 
Ciprofloxacin and ceftriaxone are reasonable alternative drugs; ceftriaxone can be ad­
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ministered to pregnant women. Vaccination with quadrivalent polysaccharide vaccine 
should be used to control outbreaks of serogroup C meningococcal disease. Surveil­
lance for serogroup C disease and calculation of attack rates can be used to identify 
outbreaks and determine whether use of meningococcal vaccine is warranted. 
Pertussis 
Pertussis vaccines (whole-cell and acellular) are licensed for use only among chil­
dren aged 6 weeks through 6 years. If acellular pertussis vaccines are licensed for use 
in adults in the future, booster doses of adult formulations may be recommended to 
prevent the occurrence and spread of the disease in HCWs. 
Typhoid 
Workers in microbiology laboratories who frequently work with S. typhi should be 
vaccinated with any one of the three typhoid vaccines distributed in the United States: 
oral live-attenuated Ty21a vaccine (one enteric-coated capsule taken on alternate days 
to a total of four capsules), the parenteral heat-phenol inactivated vaccine (two 0.5 mL 
subcutaneous doses, separated by ≥4 weeks), or the capsular polysaccharide paren­
teral vaccine (one 0.5 mL intramuscular dose). Under conditions of continued or 
repeated exposure to S. typhi, booster doses are required to maintain immunity, every 
5 years if the oral vaccine is used, every 3 years if the heat-phenol inactivated paren­
teral vaccine is used, and every 2 years if the capsular polysaccharide vaccine is used. 
Live-attenuated Ty21a vaccine should not be used among immunocompromised per­
sons, including those infected with HIV (13 ). 
Vaccinia 
Vaccinia vaccine is recommended only for the few persons who work with 
orthopoxviruses (e.g., laboratory workers who directly handle cultures or animals 
contaminated or infected with vaccinia, recombinant vaccinia viruses, or other or­
thopoxviruses that replicate readily in humans [e.g., monkeypox, cowpox, and 
others]). Other HCWs (e.g., physicians and nurses) whose contact with these viruses 
is limited to contaminated materials (e.g., dressings) and who adhere to appropriate 
infection control measures are at lower risk for accidental infection than laboratory 
workers, but may be considered for vaccination. When indicated, vaccinia vaccine 
should be administered every 10 years (10 ). Vaccinia vaccine should not be adminis­
tered to immunocompromised persons (including persons infected with HIV), persons 
who have eczema or a history of eczema, or to pregnant women (10 ). 
Other Vaccine-Preventable Diseases 
Health-care workers are not at substantially increased risk than the general adult 
population for acquiring diphtheria, pneumococcal disease, or tetanus. Therefore, 
they should seek these immunizations from their primary care provider, according to 
ACIP recommendations (12,14 ). 
Tetanus and Diphtheria 
Primary vaccination of previously unvaccinated adults consists of three doses of 
adult tetanus-diphtheria toxoid (Td): 4–6 weeks should separate the first and second 
     
    
   
   
    
   
   
 
    
    
  
    
     
   
   
  
  







     
    
    
    
    
    
   
 
   
      
29 Vol. 46 / No. RR-18 MMWR 
doses; the third dose should be administered 6–12 months after the second (12 ). After 
primary vaccination, a tetanus-diphtheria (Td) booster is recommended for all persons 
every 10 years. HCWs should be encouraged to receive recommended Td booster 
doses. 
Pneumococcal Disease 
Persons for whom pneumococcal vaccine is recommended include: 
• Persons aged ≥65 years. 
• Persons aged ≥2 and <65 years who, because they have certain chronic illnesses, 
are at increased risk for pneumococcal disease, its complications, or severe dis­
ease if they become infected. Included are those who have chronic cardio­
vascular disease (i.e., congestive heart failure [CHF] or cardiomyopathies), 
chronic pulmonary disease (i.e., chronic obstructive pulmonary disease [COPD] 
or emphysema, but not asthma), diabetes mellitus, alcoholism, chronic liver dis­
ease (cirrhosis), or cerebrospinal fluid leaks. 
• Persons ≥2 and <65 years of age with functional or anatomic asplenia (e.g., sickle 
cell disease, splenectomy). 
• Persons ≥2 and <65 years of age living in special environments or social settings 
where an increased risk exists for invasive pneumococcal disease or its compli­
cations (e.g., Alaska Natives and certain American Indian populations). 
• Immunocompromised persons ≥ 2 years of age, including 
– persons infected with HIV and persons who have leukemia, lymphoma, 
Hodgkin’s disease, multiple myeloma, generalized malignancy, chronic renal 
failure, nephrotic syndrome; 
– persons with other conditions associated with immunosuppression (e.g., or­
gan or bone marrow transplantation); and 
– persons receiving immunosuppressive chemotherapy, including long-term 
systemic corticosteroids. 
Immunization of Immunocompromised Health-Care Workers 
ACIP has published recommendations for immunization of immunocompromised 
persons (177 ). ACIP recommendations for use of individual vaccines or immune 
globulins also should be consulted for additional information regarding the 
epidemiology of the diseases and the safety and the efficacy of the vaccines or im­
mune globulin preparations. Specific recommendations for use of vaccines depend 
upon the type of immunocompromising condition (Table 4). 
Killed or inactivated vaccines do not represent a danger to immunocompromised 
HCWs and generally should be administered as recommended for workers who are 
not immunocompromised. Additional vaccines, particularly bacterial polysaccharide 
vaccines (i.e., Haemophilus influenzae type b [Hib] vaccine, pneumococcal vaccine, 
and meningococcal vaccine), are recommended for persons whose immune function 
is compromised by anatomic or functional asplenia and certain other conditions. Fre­
     
 
  
   
     
 
  
        
  
 
   
 
TABLE 4. Summary of ACIP recommendations concerning immunization of health-care workers with special conditions 
 R  
Severe Alcoholism 
Immuno­ and Alcoholic 
Vaccine Pregnancy HIV Infection suppression* Asplenia Renal Failure Diabetes Cirrhosis 
BCG C C C UI UI UI UI 
Hepatitis A UI UI UI UI UI UI R† 
Hepatitis B R R R R R R R 
Influenza R§ R R R R R R 
Measles, Mumps, Rubella C R¶ C R R R R 
Meningococcus UI UI UI R† UI UI UI 
Poliovirus vaccine, UI UI UI UI UI UI UI 
inactivated (IPV)** 
Poliovirus vaccine, live, UI C C UI UI UI UI 
oral (OPV)** 
Pneumococcus† UI  R  R  R  R  R
Rabies UI UI UI UI UI UI UI 
Tetanus/diphtheria† R R R R R R R 
 Typhoid, Inactivated & Vi†† UI UI UI UI UI UI UI 
Typhoid, Ty21a UI C C UI UI UI UI 
Varicella C C C R R R R 
Vaccinia C C C UI UI UI UI 
*Severe immunosuppression can be caused by congenital immunodeficiency, leukemia, lymphoma, generalized malignancy or therapy 
with alkylating agents, antimetabolites, ionizing radiation, or large amounts of corticosteroids. 
† Recommendation is based on the person’s underlying condition rather than occupation.
 
§ Women who will be in the second or third trimester of pregnancy during the influenza season.
 
¶ Contraindicated in HIV-infected persons who have evidence of severe immunosuppression.
 
**Vaccination is recommended for unvaccinated health-care workers who have close contact with patients who may be excreting wild 
polioviruses. Primary vaccination with IPV is recommended because the risk for vaccine-associated paralysis after administration of 
OPV is higher among adults than among children. Health care workers who have had a primary series of OPV or IPV who are directly 
involved with the provision of care to patients who may be excreting poliovirus may receive another dose of either IPV or OPV. Any 
suspected case of poliomyelitis should be investigated immediately. If evidence suggests transmission of wild poliovirus, control 
measures to contain further transmission should be instituted immediately, including an OPV vaccination campaign. 
†† Capsular polysaccharide parenteral vaccine.
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quently, the immune response of immunocompromised persons to these vaccine an­
tigens is not as good as that of nonimmunocompromised persons; higher doses or 
more frequent boosters may be required. Even with these modifications, the immune 
response may be suboptimal. 
HIV-Infected Persons 
Specific recommendations for vaccination of HIV-infected persons have been de­
veloped (Table 4). In general, live virus or live bacterial vaccines should not be 
administered to HIV-infected persons. However, asymptomatic HCWs need not be 
tested for HIV infection before administering live virus vaccines. 
The following recommendations apply to all HCWs infected with HIV: 
• MMR vaccine is recommended for all asymptomatic HIV-infected HCWs who do 
not have evidence of severe immunosuppression. Administration of MMR to HIV-
infected HCWs who are symptomatic, but who do not have evidence of severe 
immunosuppression, should be considered. Measles vaccine is not recom­
mended for HIV-infected persons with evidence of severe immunosuppression. 
• Enhanced inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) is the only poliovirus vaccine rec­
ommended for HIV-infected persons (11 ). Live oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) 
should not be administered to immunocompromised persons. 
• Influenza and pneumococcal vaccines are indicated for all HIV-infected persons 
(influenza vaccination for persons aged ≥ 6 months and pneumococcal vaccina­
tion for persons aged ≥2 years). 
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN VACCINATION OF 
HEALTH-CARE WORKERS 
Other considerations important to appropriate immunoprophylaxis of HCWs in­
clude maintenance of complete immunization records, policies for catch-up 
vaccination of HCWs, work restrictions for susceptible employees who are exposed to 
vaccine-preventable diseases, and control of outbreaks of vaccine-preventable dis­
ease in health-care settings. Additional vaccines not routinely recommended for 
HCWs in the United States may be indicated for those who travel to certain other re­
gions of the world to perform research or health-care work (e.g., as medical 
volunteers in a humanitarian effort). 
Immunization Records 
An immunization record should be maintained for each HCW. The record should 
reflect documented disease and vaccination histories as well as immunizing agents 
administered during employment. At each immunization encounter, the record should 
be updated and the HCW encouraged to maintain the record as appropriate (15 ). 
Catch-Up Vaccination Programs 
Managers of health-care facilities should consider implementing catch-up vaccina­
tion programs for HCWs who are already employed, in addition to policies to ensure 
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that newly hired HCWs receive necessary vaccinations. This strategy will help prevent 
outbreaks of vaccine preventable diseases (see Outbreak Control). Because education 
enhances the success of many immunization programs, reference materials should be 
available to assist in answering questions regarding the diseases, vaccines, and 
toxoids, and the program or policy being implemented. Conducting educational work­
shops or seminars several weeks before the initiation of the program may be 
necessary to ensure acceptance of program goals. 
Work Restrictions for Susceptible Workers After Exposure 
Postexposure work restrictions ranging from restriction of contact with high-risk 
patients to complete exclusion from duty are appropriate for HCWs who are not im­
mune to certain vaccine-preventable diseases (Table 5). Recommendations 
concerning work restrictions in these circumstances have been published (16,35,178 ). 
Outbreak Control 
Hospitals should develop comprehensive policies and protocols for management 
and control of outbreaks of vaccine-preventable disease. Outbreaks of vaccine-pre­
ventable diseases are costly and disruptive. Outbreak prevention, by ensuring that all 
HCWs who have direct contact with patients are fully immunized, is the most effective 
and cost-effective control strategy. Disease-specific outbreak control measures are 
described in published ACIP recommendations (Table 1) (1–15 ) and infection control 
references (16,35,95, 178–180 ). 
Vaccines Indicated for Foreign Travel 
Hospital and other HCWs who perform research or health-care work in foreign 
countries may be at increased risk for acquiring certain diseases (e.g, hepatitis A, po­
liomyelitis, Japanese encephalitis, meningococcal disease, plague, rabies, typhoid, or 
yellow fever). Vaccinations against those diseases should be considered when indi­
cated for foreign travel (181 ). Elevated risks for acquiring these diseases may stem 
from exposure to patients in health-care settings (e.g., poliomyelitis, meningococcal 
disease), but may also arise from circumstances unrelated to patient care (e.g, high 
endemicity of hepatitis A or exposure to arthropod disease vectors [yellow fever]). 
     TABLE 5. Work restrictions* for health-care workers (HCWs) exposed to or infected 
with certain vaccine-preventable diseases 





previously vaccinated HCWs 
who have not had a Td 
 booster dose within the 




















Upper respiratory infections 
(Persons at high risk for 
complications of influenza as 




 (Susceptible personnel) 
Exclude from duty. 
 Exclude from duty. 
 Exclude from duty. 
Restrict from patient contact 
and food handling. 
 Standard precautions should 
always be observed. No 
restriction unless 
epidemiologically linked to 
transmission of infection. 
 These HCWs should not 
perform exposure-prone 
invasive procedures until they 
 have sought counsel from an 
 expert review panel which 
should review and recommend 
 the procedures the worker can 
perform, taking into account 
the specific procedure as well 
as the skill and technique of 
the worker (30). 
 During particular seasons (e.g., 
during winter when influenza 
and/or RSV are prevalent), 
consider excluding personnel 
with acute febrile upper 
respiratory infections 
 (including influenza) from care 
of high-risk patients. 
Exclude from duty 
Exclude from duty. 
Until antimicrobial therapy is 
completed and 2 
nasopharyngeal cultures 
 obtained ≥24 hours apart are 
negative. 
Same as active diphtheria 
Same as active diphtheria. 
7 days after onset of jaundice. 
Universal precautions should 
always be observed. 
Until HBeAg† is negative. 
 Until acute symptoms resolve. 
 7 days after rash appears. 
5th day after 1st exposure 
through 21st day after last 
exposure and/or 7 days after 
the rash appears. 
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     TABLE 5. Work restrictions* for health-care workers (HCWs) exposed to or infected 
with certain vaccine-preventable diseases — Continued 
Disease/Problem Work Restriction	 Duration 
Mumps 
Active Exclude from duty 9 days after onset of parotitis. 
Postexposure Exclude from duty. 12th day after 1st exposure 
 (Susceptible personnel) through 26th day after last 
exposure or 9 days after onset 
of parotitis. 
Pertussis 
Active Exclude from duty	 Beginning of catarrhal stage 
 through 3rd week after onset 
  of paroxysms or until 5 days 
 after start of effective 
antimicrobial therapy. 
Postexposure 
Symptomatic personnel Exclude from duty  5 days after start of effective 
antimicrobial therapy. 
Asymptomatic personnel No restriction, on antimicrobial 
prophylactic therapy. 
Rubella 
Active  Exclude from duty 5 days after the rash appears. 
Postexposure Exclude from duty. 7th day after 1st exposure 
 (Susceptible personnel) through 21st day after last 
exposure and/or 5 days after 
rash appears. 
Varicella 
Active Exclude from duty Until all lesions dry and crust. 
Postexposure Exclude from duty 10th day after 1st exposure 
 (Susceptible personnel) through 21st day (28th day if 
 VZIG administered) after the 
last exposure; if varicella 
 occurs, until all lesions dry and 
crust. 
Zoster 
(Localized in normal person) Cover lesions; restrict from 
 care of high-risk patients§. 
Same as varicella. 
Postexposure Restrict from patient contact. 
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*Adapted from: 
- (173 ) CDC. Recommendations for preventing transmission of human immunodeficiency virus 
and hepatitis B virus to patients during exposure-prone invasive procedures. MMWR 
1991;40(RR-8):1–8. 
- (95 ) CDC. Guideline for isolation precautions in hospitals. Recommendations of the Hospital 
Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) and the National Center for Infectious 
Diseases. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 1996;17:53–80. 
- (178 ) Williams WW: CDC guideline for infection control in hospital personnel. Infect Control 
1983;4(Suppl):326-49. 
†HBeAg = Hepatitis B e antigen. 
§Patients who are susceptible to varicella and at increased risk for complications of varicella 
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